Mendeley
TY  _  JOUR
ID  -  1400090332389
TI  -  Goodness of Justice: An Intellectual or Rational Theorem?
JO  -  Kheradname-ye sadra
JA  -  ES
LA  -  fa
SN  -  1560-0874
AU  -  imami Mohammad 
AU  -  Farzaneh Hossein 
AD  -  استادیار گروه فقه و مبانی حقوق دانشگاه علوم اسلامی رضوی
AD  -  معاونت آموزشی دانشگاه علوم اسلامی رضوی
AD  -  استادیار دانشگاه علوم اسلامی رضوی
Y1  -  2022
PY  -  2022
VL  -  1
IS  -  
SP  -  13
EP  -  28
KW  -  goodness of justice
KW  -   moral propositions
KW  -   intellectual
KW  -   badness of cruelty
KW  -   evident propositions
KW  -   rational
DO  -  
N2  -  “Justice is good” and “cruelty is bad” are two of the most frequently used principles and propositions in various disciplines. Mutikallimun consider these two propositions to be rational, primary necessary, evident, certain, and needless of reasoning. However, some philosophers deny their evidence and certainty and consider them as generally accepted propositions that bear no truth except for conforming to thinkers’ views. Certainty in relation to these two propositions means believing in the correctness of their use in arguments and production of scientific results, and indemonstrability refers to their dialectical application. Some believe that the indemonstrability in the interpretation of such propositions would undermine the basis of moral propositions. The question here is why there is so much controversy about these two apparently evident propositions. The findings of this descriptive-analytic study reveal that the solution must be found in distinguishing between “intellectual goodness” and “rational goodness”. When these two propositions are considered as individual intellectual propositions, they are hypothetical and genetic judgments; however, at a rational social level, they are evident and, of course, mentally posited and, unlike the general view of logicians, they must be viewed as certain propositions (not as generally accepted ones). In addition, some statements such as “They have no basis but popularity”, which are used by some philosophers and logicians about the two propositions, are not used to deny their reality. Rather, they are intended to deny the evidence and necessity of these two propositions in intellectual analyses. Thus, no damage is done to their support for moral propositions.
UR  - rimag.ir/en/Article/32389
L1  - rimag.ir/en/Article/Download/32389
ER  -  
